The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states: A religious sect, may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national councils against any danger from that source: A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state.3. Cite this description ends , IX, 348–57). It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.

Printed by J. 41-46 (Madison), Section VIII: Structure of New Government: Federalists No. 23-29 (Hamilton), Section V: Powers of Taxation: Federalists No. 69-74 (Hamilton), Section XI: Need for a Strong Executive: Federalists No. “The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.”, “In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.”. After the Tea Party, Britain responded with economic actions including a blockade of Boston Harbor. Powered by Beck & Stone, The “violence of faction” is the “mortal disease” of popular governments. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, Section II: Advantages of Union:
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole. The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS. Federalist Papers helped in removing the faction in which the benefits economic interests … But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. to date; Chicago, 1962——). 68 (Hamilton), Section XI: Need for a Strong Executive: Federalists No.

81 (Hamilton), Section XII: Judiciary: Federalist No. Note: The annotations to this document, and any other Adair suggests that JM deliberately omitted his list of motives from The Federalist. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. 10 (James Madison). These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administration. Through its grants program, the NHPRC supports a wide range of activities to However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. From this view of the subject, it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man.” Thus, there are many sources of factions, “but the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.” The “regulation of these various and interfering interests,” that “grow up of necessity in civilized nations & forms the principal task of modern legislation and forms the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.”, Further consideration of I b). “The inference to which we are brought is that [I] the causesof faction cannot be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of [II] controlling its effects.”, Further consideration of II) “controlling its effects.” “The republican principle” of majority rule is the solution to minority faction. See also JM’s first speech of 6 June and his first speech of 26 June 1787 at the Federal Convention, and his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. 1787. A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking.
3 (Jay), Section I: General Introduction: Federalist No. Throughout the papers, the idea of that more perfect union occupies center stage. Summary and Analysis; Original Text Federalist #10 is Madison’s first essay in The Federalist. Is a law proposed concerning private debts? If there is no national revenue, then taxes will not be taken from commerce and instead will be placed on the land. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. III b)** clinches the case for IV b) over IV a). 15 (Hamilton), Section III: Disadvantages of Existing Government: Federalists No. Papers of James Madison (10 vols. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: Eventually, James Madison lost faith in a one party system, and helped organize which political party to compete with the Federalists? The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.” And that leads to “the division of society into different interests and parties.”, Further consideration of I b).

Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. JM repeated these motives in his first speech of 6 June 1787, in his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. 1787, and alluded to them in The Federalist No.

“To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government, is then the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has labored and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.”, The introduction of II a) and II b) as the solutions to majority faction. IV b) is better than IV a) because it provides “a greater probability of a fit choice” of representatives. McLean description begins The Federalist, A Collection of Essays, “A number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”, How can we cure “the mischiefs of faction?” We can either cure it by I) “removing its causes,” or II) “controlling its effects.”, There are “two methods of removing the causes of faction”: I a) destroy “the liberty essential to its existence,” or I b) give “to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”, I a) is a “remedy that is worse than the disease,” because it is “unwise.” It entails the abolition of liberty, “which is essential to political life.”, I b) is “impracticable.” Opinions, passions, and interests are unlikely to be in harmony. 75-77 (Hamilton), Section XII: Judiciary: Federalist No.

The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.